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INTRODUCTION
Although the Solicitor General is appointed by the
President and serves under the Attorney General, he has
gradually come to enjoy a tradition of independence in carrying
out his official responsibilities. He is only rarely subject to
direction by either the President or the Attorney General, and as
a practical matter, he is in most cases the final decisionmaker
with respect to both designing a strategy for government
litigation in the Supreme Court and deciding whether to appeal
trial court decisions adverse to the government.
On occasion, however, a President will put deference aside
and involve himself directly in determining what the
government's legal positions are going to be. Documented
instances of such presidential involvement are rare, since most
occur in the course of rather low-profile discussions within the
administration that never become known to the public.
Nevertheless, a few examples have received significant
attention, either contemporaneously or some years afterwards,
often as the result of revealing memoir accounts.
In the Truman Administration, for example, the President
was reportedly involved in the groundbreaking decision to
authorize the government's amicus brief in Shelley v. Kraemer,'
* Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law, Yale Law School; of counsel, Morrison & Foerster
LLP; Solicitor General of the United States (1993-96).
1. 334 U.S. I (1948).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 2001)
HeinOnline -- 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 509 2001
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
its first in a civil rights case.2 For his part, President Eisenhower
added several sentences to the government's brief in Brown v.
Board of Education,3 which were then edited by an assistant in
Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff's office.4 And President Nixon
once ordered Acting Attorney General Kleindienst to drop the
government's pursuit of an important antitrust suit, although
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold had already approved an
appeal to the Supreme Court. But Griswold bided his time and
sought several extensions while waiting for final instructions,
and eventually received clearance to file the government's brief.5
A comprehensive history of the Solicitor General's office
would probably include other examples, but I discuss in this
essay only some recent cases in which Presidents intervened,
most of which are familiar to me from firsthand experience.
However I learned about each, though, I hope that my insider's
perspective will give the reader an appreciation for the ways in
which the realities of the political world and the power of the
Presidency can have an impact on the Solicitor General's work.
THE PRESIDENTS AND THE CASES
Carter
I have yet to write a memoir of my tenure as Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Carter Administration. I
can, however, offer this personal account of events leading up to
the government's filing of its amicus brief in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.6 Under my leadership, the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
recommended amicus participation in support of the University
2. See Barton J. Bernstein, The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and
Civil Rights, in Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration 269, 296-97 (B.
Bernstein ed., Quadrangle Books 1970).
3. 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
4. Victor H. Kramer, President Eisenhower's Handwritten Changes in the Brief on
Relief in the School Segregation Cases: Minding the Whys and Wherefores, 9
Constitutional Commentary 223 (1992).
5. Richard Ben-Veniste & George Frampton, Jr., Stonewall: The Real Story of the
Watergate Prosecution 377-378 (Simon & Schuster 1977).
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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of California and its affirmative action program, while the
Assistant and Deputy in Solicitor General Wade McCree's
office recommended amicus participation in favor of Bakke.
Before McCree himself became fully involved, President Carter
gave a press conference at which he pledged to support
affirmative action. The Solicitor General's office nonetheless
drafted a brief supporting Bakke, which, unsurprisingly, met
with resistance at the White House. Following contentious
meetings at various levels, Attorney General Griffin Bell
attempted to shield McCree from the pressure emanating from
the White House and the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, and McCree indicated later that he never received any
direct orders from the White House. He was, however, aware of
the pressure being put on Bell.8
In the end, McCree did not follow the advice of his career
staff, and he eventually decided to recommend that the Court
remand the case to the California courts for decision.9 He and I
then spent several days working with his top staff in a nearly
nonstop session that produced a brief supporting the principle of
affirmative action. That brief appears to have influenced Justice
Powell, for he opined-as we had argued-that race may, under
some circumstances, be used as one factor in a system that
includes a whole range of admissions criteria, so long as no
quotas result. °
Reagan
The Bob Jones Case
During the Reagan Administration, a major controversy
arose over Bob Jones University v. United States," which
involved the question of a tax exemption for a religious, but
7. See Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law
47 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1987).
8. Caplan, supra n. 7, at 46.
9. Id. at 39-46; Rebecca Mae Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law 75-
76 (Temple U. Press 1992).
10. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
11. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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racially segregated, institution. Solicitor General Rex Lee
decided to recuse himself from the case, because he had before
becoming Solicitor General been involved in the debate over tax
exemptions for religious institutions. As a result of Lee's
decision, Lawrence Wallace, the Senior Deputy Solicitor
General, became Acting Solicitor General. But as a career
member of the Solicitor General's staff, Wallace too had a
history. He had signed a Supreme Court brief during the Carter
Administration supporting the Internal Revenue Service's
revocation of the university's tax-exempt status, which made
him understandably uncomfortable about supporting the
successor administration's contrary position. The Reagan
administration nonetheless pushed for an argument in support of
the university.
After what must have been several highly charged
discussions, the government's brief ultimately argued the
administration's line, but Wallace was authorized to include a
footnote pointing out that he personally did not subscribe to the
government's position on the first and central question
presented. 2 The Court eventually ruled eight to one in favor of
the Internal Revenue Service, demonstrating among other
things that the President's success in prevailing upon the
Solicitor General's office to espouse his position is no guarantee
of his administration's success before the Supreme Court.
The Beck Case
Charles Fried, who followed Rex Lee as President
Reagan's Solicitor General, recounts only one incident of White
House interference with his work. The case, Communications
Workers of America v. Beck, 4 involved the use of union dues
and fees to support pro-union candidates and parties. Fried
believed that no state action was involved in the practice, and
that the Taft-Hartley Act could not plausibly be read to forbid
the compulsory use of union dues in support of union-approved
12. See Caplan, supra n. 7, at 51-64; Salokar, supra n. 9, at 61-62.
13. Bob Jones U., 461 U.S. at 585.
14. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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candidates.'5 When proofs of Fried's brief were circulated to the
White House, however, someone there contacted Attorney
General Edwin Meese to express displeasure with Fried's
analysis of the law.'6 This objection prompted Meese to call a
high-level meeting at which various members of the
administration expressed dissatisfaction with the brief, 7 but it
was ultimately filed as written. In the end, the White House
position-that the Taft-Hartley Act could be construed to
prohibit the compulsory use of union dues-prevailed five to
three in the Court.'8 Discussing the incident later, Fried
emphasized that "[i]n Beck [he] received no direct order [but]
was made aware that 'the White House' did not like the position
[he] was about to take." "
Bush
In the first Bush Administration, my predecessor as
Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, argued for the government in
United States v. Mabus2°that the state of Mississippi should not
be responsible for providing additional funding for traditionally
black colleges.2' After meeting with a group of black college
presidents, however, President Bush ordered Starr to reverse the
government's position in the case (eventually to be known as
United States v. Fordice22), and to argue instead that increased
state aid to black public colleges was necessary in order to
remedy past discrimination. Deferring to the President, Starr
filed a reply brief that urged the Court to require the state to
supply additional funding to traditionally black colleges in order
to overcome the effects of its segregated system of higher
education.23
15. Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand
Account 178-80 (Simon & Schuster 1991).
16. Id. at 180.
17. Id. at 181.
18. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
19. Fried, supra n. 15, at 198.
20. 499 U.S. 958 (1991).
21. Br. of Petr. at 40-41, n. 39, U.S. v. Mabus, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
22. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
23. Reply Br. of Petr. at 16-17, U.S. v. Mabus, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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Clinton
No doubt it is obvious by now that "into every Solicitor
General's life a little rain must fall!" And so it was with me. I
remember two occasions on which President Clinton either in
effect, or explicitly, directed me to reverse legal positions that I
had taken after consulting with the Attorney General.
The Knox Case
The first was in Knox v. United States,24 which involved the
child-pornography conviction of a Penn State graduate student
who had a previous conviction for receiving child pornography
through the mails. Using information that came to their attention
some time after his earlier conviction, law enforcement agents
obtained and executed a search warrant at Knox's residence,
turning up several videocassettes that contained vignettes of
barely dressed teenage and pre-teen girls. 25 The legal issue
before the district court was whether any of the tapes depicted a
minor engaging in "sexually explicit conduct," which was
defined in the statute as "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area." 26 The court concluded that the tapes fit that
definition, finding that although none of the girls were nude, the
videos' focus on areas in close proximity to the genitals,
specifically "the uppermost portion of the inner thigh," was
included within the statute's prohibition against displays of the
pubic area."
Knox took an appeal. Although it first went out of its way
to reject the district court's definition of pubic area, the Third
Circuit affirmed, holding that "nude exposure of the genitals or
pubic area [was] not necessary for an exhibition to take place." 
2 8
Knox then filed a petition for certiorari that was granted over the
government's opposition. 9 And that is where I came in. My job
was to prepare the brief on the merits.
24. 510 U.S. 939 (1993).
25. U.S. v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 817 (3d Cir. 1992).
26, U.S. v. Knox, 776 F. Supp. 174, 180 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
27. Id.
28, Knox, 977 F.2d at 823.
29. Knox v. U.S., 508 U.S. 959 (1993).
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I reviewed the case, and concluded that the Third Circuit's
decision represented an extremely strained and incorrect
construction of the statute. I was concerned, therefore, that the
grant of certiorari did not bode well for the government's
defense of that interpretation. I was also concerned about the
possibility of the Court's issuing a broad adverse ruling likely to
jeopardize later child-pornography prosecutions that presented
no novel questions like those raised in Knox.
My consideration of the facts surrounding Knox's
prosecution made me even more uneasy. First, no other such
prosecution had ever been brought by the Justice Department.
Second, the United States Attorney who brought the Knox
prosecution did so without prior approval from the Department
of Justice, which was a violation of department regulations.
Third, the prosecutor had intentionally left out evidence of
Knox's collection of hard-core child pornography because, as he
told me, he wanted it to be a test case.
Given the legal and factual circumstances, I believed that it
was important to get the Knox case out of the Supreme Court as
quickly as possible. I did so by filing a brief confessing error
and urging the Court to vacate and remand the case to the Third
Circuit for further consideration in light of an alternative reading
of the statute, one that inferred a test requiring the genitals or
pubic area to be discernible in order for a particular pose to
constitute an illegal exhibition.
The Supreme Court did as I requested,' and "all hell broke
loose." Now, I was prepared for some criticism of my decision.
A distinguished career lawyer in my office had in fact advised
me simply to advance the arguments already made by the office,
which would have allowed the Supreme Court to rule against the
position so unwisely taken by the federal prosecutors who had
initiated the case. I knew, then, that there were those who
disagreed with my strategy, but I had no idea that my decision
would produce a torrent of criticism from Congress, child
30. Br. of Respt. at 22-23, Knox v. U.S., 510 U.S. 939 (1993).
31. Knox, 510 U.S. at 939.
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protection groups, and fundamentalist religious organizations.32
Unhappily for me, however, it did so.
The Senate responded to the Supreme Court's ruling by
passing a unanimous resolution that indicated its rejection of my
analysis.33 Shortly thereafter, the President publicly released a
letter to Attorney General Janet Reno in which he fully agreed
"with the Senate about what the proper scope of the child
pornography law should be," and directed her to work with
Congress to develop "the broadest possible protections against
child pornography and exploitation."' 4 On another front, a
former Justice Department official who had been in charge of
child pornography prosecutions in the Bush administration took
out after me publicly.35 Although he was on record in earlier
testimony before the Senate as actually agreeing with my
construction of the statute, he helped generate a wave of critical
calls to the Justice Department that nearly immobilized our
telephone system for two days. The House ultimately joined the
Senate in criticizing my position, and it too passed a resolution
that rejected my reading of the statute, albeit by a smaller
margin.
I was happy to escape the storm by getting back to the work
of briefing the case, and on remand, the Third Circuit affirmed
in a way that I found promising. In essence, it concluded that
Knox's conviction should be affirmed irrespective of whether its
reading of the statute or mine controlled.36 Knox sought
certiorari once again. I thought that the prudent approach at this
juncture was for the government to file an opposition to
certiorari on the grounds that any ruling from the Court would
be unlikely to affect Knox's conviction. Under such
circumstances, I believed that the Court would not be
predisposed to accept the case for review a second time. But the
Attorney General concluded that we should express our
wholehearted agreement with the Third Circuit's test. She and I
32. See e.g. Henry J. Reske, A Flap over Flip-Flops, 80 ABA J. 12 (Jan. 1994); Stuart
Taylor, Jr., As Politics Take Over, Justice Suffers in Kidporn Case, Conn. L. Trib. 19 (Dec.
6, 1993).
33. See Taylor, supra n. 32.
34. id.
35. See Julie Cohen, A Legal About-Face into a Minefield, Leg. Times 2 (Nov. 22,
1993).
36. U.S. v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 754 (3d Cir. 1994).
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attempted in earnest to reach a compromise but failed, because I
told her that I could not sign briefs taking diametrically
opposing positions at different stages of a single case. She
respected that decision, and filed a brief bearing her signature
and those of certain other Department of Justice officials, but no
signature from anyone in my office. And there it all ended, for
certiorari was denied.37
The Christians Case
The second occasion on which the power of the Presidency
had a direct impact on my work in the Clinton administration
occurred about a year later in a case with the incredibly ironic
title of Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church.38 There, a
trustee in bankruptcy brought an adversary proceeding against
Crystal Evangelical to recover about $13,500.00 in pre-petition
contributions. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's
motion,39 the district court affirmed, 40 and the church then
appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
41
By the time the case reached the circuit court, Congress had
passed and the President had signed as one of his first pieces of
legislation, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
42
That act provided that the government was permitted to
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrated that the burden met a compelling governmental
interest and was the least restrictive means of achieving that
important end. The Eighth Circuit notified the Attorney General
of the case and invited her views on the apparent conflict
between the Bankruptcy Code and RFRA.
After a long and spirited debate in the Justice Department, I
decided, with the Attorney General's approval, to file a brief
supporting the trustee. In short, our position was that the Code
did not in this case substantially burden free exercise, since the
37. Knox v. U.S., 513 U.S. 1109 (1995).
38. 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992)
39. Id. at 897.
40. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 152 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1993).
41. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
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money given to the church actually belonged to the bankruptcy
estate when the debtors made their tithes, and the debtors were
not entitled to treat the estate's money as their own. Moreover,
even if there was a substantial burden, the bankruptcy law's
treatment of pre-petition transfers like these met a compelling
need-preventing tax evasion by those inclined to hide their
assets by pretending to have donated them to churches-that
could not be achieved in a less restrictive manner. Satisfied with
our analysis, we filed our brief and waited for the case to be set
for oral argument.
Several months passed. And then, about ten days before the
Eighth Circuit was to hear the case, I began to get a sense that
some members of the White House staff and, more important,
the President himself, were having second thoughts about our
brief. In an effort to satisfy those questioning the Justice
Department's position, the Attorney General held a mock oral
argument at which I presented our position, and a top official in
the Department who disagreed with me argued for the church.
Afterwards, the Attorney General expressed her continuing
approval of the brief we had filed. I was heartened and relieved.
On the White House front, though, the press reported that a
group critical of the Department's position had managed to
schedule a meeting with the President at which to express its
members' concerns. 3 On the afternoon before oral argument, I
was advised to stay close to my telephone because the
Christians case was being actively discussed at the White
House. Late that night, I learned that the President had decided
that we should withdraw our brief and decline to participate in
the oral argument. I immediately called the Civil Division
lawyer who was to argue the case, advised him of the
President's decision, and got his agreement to sign the
withdrawal letter that I was about to fax to his hotel in St. Louis.
He filed the letter the next morning, and the Eighth Circuit went
on without US, 4 eventually holding for the church by a two-to-
one vote.45 I learned later that one of the judges on the panel
43. See e.g. Sherrie F. Nachman, Bill Clinton's Divine Intervention, XVI Am. Law. 15
(Nov. 1994).
44. See Pierre Thomas, Clinton Stops Justice Department from Seeking Forfeitures of
Tithes, Wash. Post A8 (Sept. 16, 1994).
45. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
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remarked during the argument that the government was absent
because "[s]omeone spoke to them from on high., 46 And so the
President's view prevailed.47
CONCLUSION
Those who view the Solicitor General's independence as
sacrosanct might find the tale I have just told somewhat
shocking. Indeed, Francis Biddle, who served as Solicitor
General and Attorney General in turn, would almost certainly
have found it alarming, for he described the Solicitor General's
role as follows:
He determines what cases to appeal and the client has no
say in the matter, he does what his lawyer tells him, the
lawyer stands in his client's shoes, for the client is but an
abstraction .... [H]is guide is only the ethic of his
profession framed in the ambience of his experience and
judgment.48
But although I am admiring of Biddle, the matter is not so
simple for me. After all, the executive power of the United
States is vested in the President. 49 He is ultimately responsible,
in both legal and political terms, for the positions his
administration takes in court. That important reality was never
far from my mind when I served as Solicitor General. And
perhaps it led me to be a little too candid with President Clinton
during what turned out to be my job interview.
Partway through a rather wide-ranging discussion between
us in the Oval Office, the President said to me, "What is the
relationship between the Solicitor General and the President?" I
responded, "Mr. President, it is very simple. You are in the
Constitution and the Solicitor General is not." That statement
certainly let the President know that I would defer to his
46. Oliver B. Pollak, Be Just before You're Generous: Tithing and Charitable
Contributions in Bankruptcy, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 527, 573 (1996); see also Thomas,
supra n. 44.
47. The Supreme Court later held that RFRA was unconstitutional, at least insofar as
Congress sought to legislate pursuant to its powers under section five of the fourteenth
amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
48. Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 97 (Greenwood Press 1976).
49. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
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authority. And of course I also happened to draw a President
who was a lawyer, a former law professor and, I was informed, a
faithful reader of my briefs. He was without a doubt sincerely
interested in the Solicitor General's work. Whatever the
background of a particular President, however, I remain
persuaded that the question of the President's involvement in the
work of the Solicitor General is not one of whether so much as it
is one of when and how.
During my tenure, the President second-guessed my
decisions only in cases that raised difficult legal issues about
which reasonable people could disagree, so it was no surprise to
find that the President and I might see them differently. In the
Christians case, in particular, the President felt a special
responsibility for seeing to it that RFRA was aggressively
supported by his Administration, and I respected his position.
Appearances matter, however. In neither Knox, where the
President sent an open letter to the Attorney General, nor
Christians, where he granted a special audience to critics of the
Justice Department's position, did the President's handling of
the situation seem to me sufficiently sensitive in this regard. In
my estimation, the President should think about the ways in
which his intervention will be perceived by those outside the
Oval Office, and how it may affect the Solicitor General's
continuing ability to serve as a credible advocate for the
government, particularly in his appearances before the Supreme
Court. I do not think that either Knox or Christians impaired my
later effectiveness, but denied as I am the perspective of history,
I will never know for sure. I do know already, though, that these
cases hardly fit into the fun-and-games category for me.
Having described several instances in which my
predecessors and I experienced the intervention of Presidents in
our work, I conclude with the observation that these occurrences
are so notable because they have been so few. The history I have
related here indicates more that the tradition of an independent
Solicitor General retains real vigor 131 years into its history than
that it is in any danger of being overwhelmed by undue
interference from the President. And that, I think, is as it should
be.
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